Cooperation, Imitation and Correlated Matching

Javier Rivas

No 09/12, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: We study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners' Dilemma game. A well know result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we add a certain correlation to the matching process: players that belong to a pair were both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other players are randomly matched into pairs. This intuitive correlation introduced in the matching process makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run under some conditions. Furthermore, we show that no assortative equilibrium exits.

Keywords: Cooperation; Correlated Matching; Imitation; Prisoners' Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06, Revised 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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