Resolving the Eurozone Crisis--Without Debt Buyouts, National Guarantees, Mutual Insurance, or Fiscal Transfers

Stuart Holland

Economics Policy Note Archive from Levy Economics Institute

Abstract: One of the reasons for the failure of Europe's governing bodies to resolve the eurozone crisis is resistance to debt buyouts, national guarantees, mutual insurance, and fiscal transfers between member-states. Stuart Holland argues that none of these are necessary to convert a share of national bonds to Union bonds or for net issues of eurobonds--two alternative approaches to the debt crisis that would offset default risk and, by securing the euro as a reserve currency, contribute to more balanced global growth.

Date: 2011-11
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