Electoral Rules, Forms of Government and Redistributive Policy: Evidence from Agriculture and Food Policies

Alessandro Olper and Valentina Raimondi ()

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: We investigate the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960-2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies – compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies – give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.

Keywords: Electoral rules; forms of government; agriculture and food policy; political economy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 H23 O13 P16 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Electoral rules, forms of government and redistributive policy: Evidence from agriculture and food policies (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:30512

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