When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards?

Thijs Vandemoortele () and Koen Deconinck

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: Retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. This article develops a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. We show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on several factors.

Keywords: Private standards; public standards; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/licos/publications/dp/dp333

Related works:
Journal Article: When Are Private Standards More Stringent than Public Standards? (2014)
Working Paper: When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards? (2011)
Working Paper: When are Private Standards more Stringent then Public Standards? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:33313

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