The Political Economy of Geographical Indications

Koen Deconinck, Martijn Huysmans and Johan Swinnen

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant’s optimum and the government’s optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.

Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/licos/publications/dp/dp372

Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of geographical indications (2018)
Working Paper: The political economy of geographical indications (2015)
Working Paper: The political economy of geographical indications (2015)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Geographical Indications (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:37215

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