One strike and you’re out! The Master Lever’s effect on senatorial policy-making

Olga Gorelkina, Ioanna Grypari and Erin Hengel

No 201906, Working Papers from University of Liverpool, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the impact a straight-ticket voting option—a.k.a. the Master Lever—has on U.S. senators’ roll-call voting records in Congress. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find the Master Lever leads to a 3–6 percent rightward shift in senators’ policy positions. The effect is largely driven by the Republican party. To interpret our results, we analyse the Master Lever’s impact on electoral incentives and outcomes. Our findings suggest that ballot design has a non-negligible impact on policy-making. They also imply that electoral outcomes in moderate to right-leaning Master Lever states may be especially vulnerable to right-wing, non-partisan voters.

Keywords: Ballot Design; Elections; Political Positions; U.S. Senate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K16 N42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Forthcoming

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https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolof ... the,Global,South.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:liv:livedp:201906

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