Bringing the Four-Eyes-Principle to the Lab

Jan Theodor Schickora

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: The ‘Four-Eyes-Principle’ is considered as one of the most potent measures against corruption although it lacks both theoretical and empirical justification. We show in a laboratory experiment using a standard corruption game that introducing the 4EP increases corrupt behaviour, casting doubt on its usefulness as a general recommendation. Combining data on final choices with observations on the decision making processes in teams, including a content analysis of exchanged messages, provides insights into the dynamics of team decision making and shows that the individual profit maximizing motive dominates group decision making and crowds out altruistic arguments.

Keywords: Corruption; Laboratory Experiments; Group Decision Making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:12160

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