Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study

Sebastian Stoll and Gregor Zöttl

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers' welfare and turnover of the platform. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers in the period considered would decrease by around 30%, and the buyers' welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 45% of turnover of the platform.

Keywords: Procurement; Bidding; Reverse Auctions; Multi-Attribute Auctions; Non-Binding Auctions; Information Disclosure; Structural Estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 L11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:13112

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