Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation

Mathias Spichtig and Christian Traxler

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.

Keywords: Conditional Cooperation; Indirect Evolution; Social Norms; Heterogenous Environments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:1398

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