An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Hannah Hörisch and Christina Strassmair
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across and within sessions. The across subject analysis clearly rejects the deterrence hypothesis: except for very high levels of incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire.

Keywords: deterrence; law and economics; incentives; crowding out; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2139/2/crime_Munich_DP.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An Experimental Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis (2012)
Working Paper: An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:2139

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tamilla Benkelberg ().