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Consistency in Organization

Ekkehart Schlicht

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson's discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory of the firm, like the boundaries of the firm (“Williamson's puzzle”), the importance of fairness concerns within firms, the attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines. It implies a “perceptional” theory of the firm that is “realistic” in the sense advocated by Coase (1937).

Keywords: theory of the firm; hierarchy; evolutionary theory of the firm; perceptional theory of the firm; consistency; small numbers; centralization paradox; Williamson's puzzle; compensation; boundaries of the firm; fairness; small numbers; idiosyncratic exchange; entitlements; obligations; routines; framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 D02 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Consistency in Organization (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Consistency in Organization (2003) Downloads
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