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Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement

Christian Traxler and Joachim Winter ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations - such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving o work - by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.

Keywords: Norm Enforcement; Sanctioning; Social Norms; Survey Evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8992/1/CC_Survey_Evidence_V3_090121.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement (2012)
Working Paper: Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:8992

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