Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests

Vittorio Pelligra, Tommaso Reggiani () and Daniel Zizzo

No wpC13, CERBE Working Papers from CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics

Abstract: We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests in a trust game experiment. We vary systematically the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of level of each request and in terms of sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less than if requests of different size are presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness, but may decrease it.

Keywords: trust; trustworthiness; norms; reasonableness; moral wiggle room; moral licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://repec.lumsa.it/wp/wpC13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests (2016)
Working Paper: Responding to (Un)Reasonable Requests (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc13

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