Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs

Sudipta Sarangi and Robert P. Gilles

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: Recently a variety of link-based stability concepts have emerged in the literature on game theoretic models of social network formation. We investigate two basic formation properties that establish equivalence between some well known types of stable networks and their natural extensions. These properties can be identified as convexity conditions on the network payoff structures.

Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005)
Working Paper: Stable Networks and Convex Payoffs (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2005-13

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