Heterogeneity in Nash Networks

Sudipta Sarangi, Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: Heterogeneity in Nash networks can arise due to differences in the following four variables: (i) the value of information held by agents, (ii) the rate at which information decays or loses its value as it traverses the network, (iii) the prob- ability with which a links transmits information, and (iv) the cost of forming a link. In this paper we examine Nash networks, efficient networks and the existence of equilibrium networks under different heterogeneity conditions for the two-way flow model of networks.

Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2006-18

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