Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers

Sudipta Sarangi, Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Jacques Durieu

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Louisiana State University

Abstract: In this paper we characterize efficient networks for network formation games with global spillovers, that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock on collaborative oligopoly networks. In particular, we establish that efficient networks are nested split graphs in this class of games.

Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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https://www.lsu.edu/business/economics/files/workingpapers/pap13_06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient networks for a class of games with global spillovers (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2013-06

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