(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

Jean Gabszewicz and Skerdilajda Zanaj
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Theoharry Grammatikos

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements, involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement always exists: the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream firms. Thus, stable vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable. We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one.

Keywords: collusion; stability; vertical agreement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/4611 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: (Un)stable vertical collusive agreements (2015)
Journal Article: (Un)stable vertical collusive agreements (2015)
Working Paper: (Un)stable vertical collusive agreements (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:13-12

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