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Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (II)

Benteng Zou

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: One family of heterogeneous strategies in differential games with (a)symmetric players is developed in which one player adopts an anticipating open-loop strategy and the other adopts a standard Markovian strategy. Via conjecturing principle, the anticipating open-loop strategic player plans his strategy based on the possi- ble updating the rival player may take. These asymmetric strategies frame non- degenerate Markovian Nash Equilibrium, which can be subgame perfect. Except the stationary path, this kind of strategy makes the study of short-run trajectory possible, which usually are not subgame perfect. However, the short-run non- perfection provides very important policy suggestions.

Keywords: Differential Games; subgame perfect Markovian Nash Equilibrium; Heterogeneous strategy; anticipating open-loop strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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https://hdl.handle.net/10993/19676 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Differential Games with (A) symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies (2015) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-14

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