Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism

Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli and Alessandro Tampieri

DEM Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of strategy assortativity for the evolution of parochial- ism. Individuals belonging to different groups are matched in pairs to play a prisoner dilemma, conditioning their choice on the identity of the partner. Strategy assortativ- ity implies that a player is more likely to be matched with someone playing the same strategy. We find that, if the degree of strategy assortativity is sufficiently high, then parochialism (i.e., cooperate with your own group and defect with others) spreads over a group, while egoism (i.e., defect with everyone) emerges otherwise. Notably, parochialism is more likely to emerge in a smaller group.

Keywords: prisoner dilemma; cooperation; in-group favoritism; cultures; asymptotic stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy assortativity and the evolution of parochialism (2024)
Working Paper: Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism (2022)
Working Paper: Strategy Assortativity and the Evolution of Parochialism (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:luc:wpaper:21-20

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