Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments

Markus Herrmann (markus.herrmann@ecn.ulaval.ca), Bruno Nkuiya (nkuiyr@rpi.edu) and Anne-Renée Dussault

Cahiers de recherche CREATE from CREATE

Abstract: We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.

Keywords: Economics of antibiotic resistance; antibiotic innovation; monopoly; generic industry; social optimum; economic instruments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D42 I18 Q38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments (2013)
Working Paper: Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:creacr:2013-3

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