Understanding the Persistent Low Performance of African Agriculture

Sylvain Dessy (), Jacques Ewoudou and Isabelle Ouellet

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We explain the persistence of low performances in African agriculture by analyzing the determinants of farmers' decisions to modernize their farming practices. Owing to sociocultural factors specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, farmers' decisions on farming practices are strategic complements. We demonstrate that the modernization game these farmers play admits two pure-strategy, Pareto-ranked, symmetric Nash-equilibria. The equilibrium where all farmers choose to modernize their farming methods is preferred to the one where all of them choose to stick to a traditional method. We argue that scarcity and economic opportunities put forward by neo-Boserupian theories of induced-innovation as determinants of the onset agricultural innovations are, in the context of African countries, only necessary, but not sufficient to generate modernization of farming methods. Deliberate action to enhance aadoption of agricultural innovations must therefore take the African's sociocultural context into consideration, or risk failure.

Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa; Agricultural modernization; Fertilizer adoption; Supermodular games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 O13 O14 Q12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-agr and nep-dev
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0622

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