Does Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile theft Insurance Fluctuate with the Business Cycle ?

Georges Dionne () and Kili C. Wang

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We analyze the empirical relationship between opportunistic fraud and business cycle. We find that residual opportunistic fraud exists both in the contract with replacement cost endorsement and the contract with no-deductible endorsement in the Taiwan automobile theft insurance market. These results are consistent with previous literature on the relationship between fraud activity and insurance contracting. We also show that the severity of opportunistic fraud fluctuates in the opposite direction to the business cycle. Opportunistic fraud is stimulated during periods of recession and mitigated during periods of expansion.

Keywords: Opportunistic fraud; replacement cost endorsement; no-deductible endorsement; automobile theft insurance; business cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D81 G20 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Does opportunistic fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate with the business cycle? (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1121

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