A Review of Recent Theoretical and Empirical Analyses of Asymmetric Information in Road Safety and Automobile Insurance

Georges Dionnne, Pierre-Carl Michaud and Jean Pinquet
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Georges Dionne ()

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In other words, is there residual asymmetric information in observed distributions of accidents and infractions? We answer these questions in this chapter by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical results based on various data and methodologies. We present recent tests related to the identification of residual asymmetric information in road safety management and in automobile insurance contracting. We also propose a theoretical analysis of the foundations of point-record driver’s licenses observed around the world.

Keywords: Road safety; point-record driver's license; asymmetric information; moral hazard; road safety management; automobile insurance contract; empirical test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C14 C23 C33 D81 D82 G22 L90 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance (2013)
Working Paper: A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1204

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