Do Political Institutions Affect the Choice of the U.S. Cross-Listing Venue?

Jean-Claude Cosset, Charles Martineau and Anis Samet

Cahiers de recherche from CIRPEE

Abstract: We study the impact of political institutions on foreign firms’ choice of their U.S. cross-listing venue. Using two measures of political institutions (an index of political rights and a political constraint index) and controlling for various firm-level and country-level characteristics, we show that foreign firms from countries with weak political institutions are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. via the over-the-counter market and less likely to opt for an exchange-listed program (i.e., New York, Nasdaq, and AMEX).

Keywords: Cross-listing; Political institutions; Legal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G32 G34 G38 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1210

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