On the Choice between Strategic Alliance and Merger in the Airline Sector: the Role of Strategic Effects

Philippe Barla and Christos Constantatos

Cahiers de recherche from GREEN

Abstract: We consider a market with three competitors, two of which decide to cooperate. Firms first choose capacity under demand uncertainty then compete in quantities after the uncertainty has been resolved. We specify strategic alliance (SA) as an agreement where two airlines jointly choose capacity and divide it among themselves. Contrary to the full merger case, after demand is revealed the alliance members market their capacity shares independently. Our main result is that the profit of the cooperating firms is greater under SA than under full merger.

Keywords: Strategic alliance; capacity; airline industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L24 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: On the Choice between Strategic Alliance and Merger in the Airline Sector: the Role of Strategic Effects (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:lagrcr:0502

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