Entitlement in a Real Effort Ultimatum Game

Michael Carr and Phil Mellizo

No 2013_01, Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Boston, Economics Department

Abstract: Data from lab experiments support the claim that individuals have social preferences. Most models of social preferences, however, consider only the distribution of outcomes, not the source of the endowment used in the game. Once the source is considered, outcomes in the ultimatum game are more difficult to interpret. We extend the ultimatum game to allow for responder-produced endowments. We find that offers increase when the responder produces the endowment, but rejection rates are lower. Further, offers remain below 100% of the endowment, suggesting that unproductive proposers feel entitled to a part of the endowment, and responders respect this right.

JEL-codes: C91 D30 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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