Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function

Marco Runkel ()

No 8012, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two team contest model of a sports league with Nash behavior of team owners. The innovation of the analysis is that it focuses on the role of the contest success function (CSF). In case of an inelastic talent supply, revenue sharing turns out to worsen competitive balance regardless of the shape of the CSF. For the case of an elastic talent supply, in contrast, the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the specification of the CSF. We fully characterize the class of CSFs for which revenue sharing leaves unaltered competitive balance and identify CSFs ensuring that revenue sharing renders the contest closer.

Keywords: Revenue Sharing; Competitive Balance; Contest Success Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-mic and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function (2011)
Journal Article: Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function (2011)
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