A comparison of Candle Auctions and Hard Close Auctions with Common Values

Sascha Füllbrunn ()

No 9019, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: With this study, we contribute to the literature of auction design by presenting a new auction format: the Candle auction, a popular auction in the Middle Ages. Considering a common value framework, we theoretically and experimentally point out that the Candle auction, where bidding is allowed until a stochastic deadline, yields a better outcome to the seller than the Hard Close auction, the popular eBay online auction format.

Keywords: online auctions; market design; experimental economics; common value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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