The Impact of Managerial Flexibility on Negotiation Strategy and Bargaining Power

Elmar Lukas () and Andreas Welling ()
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Elmar Lukas: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Andreas Welling: Economics Institute, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus

No 110008, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: Using a dynamic real options approach we show that in a sequential bargaining framework managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover. Furthermore we compare the results of the sequential framework with the results of cooperative bargaining.

Keywords: real option; game theory; sale; negotiation; flexibility; ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:110008

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