A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything - Are Strategy Choices in Coordination Games Stable?

Lora R. Todorova (), Siegfried K. Berninghaus and Bodo Vogt ()
Additional contact information
Lora R. Todorova: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Economic Theory and Statistics
Bodo Vogt: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

No 110019, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2× 2 coordination game.The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games.

Keywords: coordination game; questionnaire; risk preferences; beliefs; best response correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2011/2011_19.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:110019

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Guido Henkel ().