Sloppy Work, Lies and Theft: A Novel Experimental Design to Study Counterproductive Behaviour

Michèle Belot and Marina Schröder

No 120018, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: We propose a novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour in a principal agent setting. The design allows us to study and derive clean measures of different forms of counterproductive behaviour in a controlled but non obtrusive manner. We ask participants to complete a specific task (identify euro coins) and report their output. Participants can engage in various forms of counterproductive behaviour, none of them being offered to them explicitly. They can make mistakes in the identification task, lie in their report or even steal coins. We present an application of the design to study the effects of different pay schemes (competition, fixed pay and piece rate) on counterproductive behaviour. On average counterproductive behaviour amounts to 10 percent of the average productivity, almost all arising through mistakes and overreporting of output. We find essentially no evidence of theft. Moreover, we find that both productive and counterproductive behaviour are significantly higher under competition than under the two other pay schemes.

Keywords: counterproductive behaviour; compensation; experiment; competition; piece rate; ?fixed pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J24 J30 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2012/2012_18.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sloppy work, lies and theft: A novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:120018

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