Are Behavioral Choices in the Ultimatum and Investment Games Strategic?

Lora R. Todorova () and Bodo Vogt ()
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Lora R. Todorova: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg
Bodo Vogt: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

No 120021, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the motivational bases of behavioral choices in the ultimatum and investment games. The focus is on investigating whether strategic considerations are important for strategy selection in the two games. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not alter the dictators' offers and trusters' investments, while it significantly decreases the proposers' offers and leads to a substantial decrease in the amount trustees give back to their partners. We interpret these results as evidence that the decisions of proposers in the ultimatum game and trustees in the investment game are strategic.

Keywords: coordination game; dictator game; ultimatum game; investment game; questionnaire; risk scale; risk preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2012/2012_21.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:120021

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