Who cares about the balderdash I spouted yesterday?* – An experiment on the volatility of bargaining norms –

Stephan Schosser ()
Additional contact information
Stephan Schosser: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

No 150013, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: When talking about possible bargaining results participants in the Nash bargaining game mainly use fairness norms to support their favored outcome. According to theory a variety of different, fair solutions exists from which the participants can choose. In this paper, we experimentally investigate Nash bargaining with a previous opportunity to chat about the bargaining outcome. We find that playing a dictator game prior to the Nash bargaining game establishes – without any additional communication – a fairness norm, the participants resort to. However, if nothing is played prior to the Nash bargaining game, participants discuss longer about what to play. In addition, we find that deviations in favor of one participant occur the longer preplay communication lasts.

Keywords: bargaining game; dictator game; norms; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.fww.ovgu.de/fww_media/femm/femm_2015/2015_13.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mag:wpaper:150013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Guido Henkel ().