The Bureaucracy Trap

Ascension Andina-Diaz, Francesco Feri () and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()
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Francesco Feri: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London.

No 2022-03, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: In a recent paper, Andina-D´?az et al. (2021) show that in a context of dynamic elections, rigid institutions induce political parties to push policies as far as the political system allows, whereas more flexible institutions can foster moderate alternation. We build on this paper to study the incentive of an elected government to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and increase institutional flexibility. We show that high levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies are very likely to persist over time, leading to a bureaucracy trap. Moreover, we find that regardless of the initial levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies, traditional long-life parties may have no incentive to undertake such a reform. This result provides a new argument to explain why bureaucratic inefficiencies persist in some countries over time

Keywords: MGradual policy implementation; political alternation; institutional reform; bureaucratic trap. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2022-3.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The bureaucracy trap (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2022-3

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