Corruption Clubs: Endogenous Thresholds in Corruption and Development

M. Emranul Haque (emranul.haque@manchester.ac.uk) and Richard Kneller

Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: The relationship between corruption and economic development is characterised by three stylised facts: (i) a strong negative correlation between corruption and development (ii) countries can remain trapped in high corruption-low development or low corruption-high development equilibria (iii) amongst intermediate levels of development corruption levels are more variable, some countries have high corruption and others low corruption. This paper argues that existing models are consistent with the first two only and demonstrates how these models might be extended to capture all three. The paper searches for the location of corruption clubs within the data and provides some explanation of their cause.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-reg and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption clubs: endogenous thresholds in corruption and development (2009)
Working Paper: Corruption Clubs: Endogenous Thresholds in Corruption and Development (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:cgbcrp:67

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