Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System

Carsten Hefeker () and Michael Neugart
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Carsten Hefeker: University of Siegen

No 200915, MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.

Keywords: labor market regulation; labor courts; uncertainty; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups ... /15-2009_hefeker.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Labor market regulation and the legal system (2010)
Working Paper: Labor market regulation and the legal system (2010)
Working Paper: Labor Market Regulation and the Legal System (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:200915

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