Inflation Targeting, Credibility, and Non-Linear Taylor Rules

Matthias Neuenkirch and Peter Tillmann

No 201235, MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the "credibility loss." Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.

Keywords: Credibility; inflation expectations; monetary policy; Taylor rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 E31 E43 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Inflation targeting, credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201235

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