Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice

Carsten Hefeker and Michael Neugart

MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are independent, the incidence of filed cases decreases while for thos policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.

Keywords: European Union law; directives; compliance; European Court of Justice; court behavior; uncertainty; legal process; European Commission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-eur and nep-reg
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https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups ... /09-2013_hefeker.pdf First 201309 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice (2016)
Working Paper: Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice (2015)
Working Paper: Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice (2013)
Working Paper: Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201309

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