Worker or Shirker – Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment

Christoph Bühren () and Thorben Kundt
Additional contact information
Christoph Bühren: University of Kassel

MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Forthcoming in

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups ... /26-2013_buehren.pdf First 201326 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201326

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bernd Hayo ().