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Imagine Being a Nice Guy: A Note on Hypothetical vs. Incentivized Social Preferences

Christoph Bühren () and Thorben Kundt
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Christoph Bühren: University of Kassel

MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: We conducted an experimental study on social preferences using dictator games similar to Fehr et al. (2008). We show that social preferences differ between participants who receive low-stakes monetary rewards for their decisions and participants who consider hypothetical stakes. The results are robust when we control for socio-demographic characteristics and participants’ risk attitudes. Besides incentives, gender plays an important role for the categorization of different social preferences.

Keywords: social preferences; incentive mechanisms; dictator games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-neu and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201349

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