Partial cross ownership and collusion
Samuel de Haas (samuel.de-haas@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de) and
Johannes Paha (johannes.paha@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de)
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Samuel de Haas: University of Giessen
MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)
Abstract:
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Keywords: Collusion; Coordinated Effects; Minority Shareholdings; Merger Control; Unilateral Effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/mag ... 6/32-2016_dehaas.pdf First 201632 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201632
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