Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability

Tim Friehe and Elisabeth Schulte ()
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Elisabeth Schulte: University of Marburg

MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: We describe how product liability interacts with regulatory product approval in influencing a firm’s incentives to acquire information about product risk, using a very parsimonious model. The firm may have insufficient information acquisition incentives when it is not fully liable for the harm caused by its product. The firm may also have excessive information acquisition incentives under both full and limited liability. We highlight efficiency inducing liability rules.

Keywords: Innovation; Product Liability; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 K13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/ma ... 7/19-2017_friehe.pdf First 201719 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201719

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