The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types

Hannes Rusch ()
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Hannes Rusch: Philipps-Universität Marburg

MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)

Abstract: A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity while relaxing the assumption that collaborators are able to perfectly identify their own kind. Conditions for the evolutionary viability of such collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games.

Keywords: cooperation; collaboration; strategy choice; evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:201739

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