Auctioning Public Office

Costas Roumanias ()
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Costas Roumanias: Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, http://www.uom.gr/index.php?tmima=3

Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Macedonia

Abstract: Campaign promises and campaign spending are modelled as integral parts of a signaling mechanism that transmits information about can- didates' abilities and proposed policies to the voters. We suggest that viewing promises and spending as inseparable parts of the same mechanism is essential in moving towards providing a microfoundation framework of political campaigns. Political competition in spending and promising is modeled as an auction which enables us to derive results about the laws governing political campaigns. The degree of commitment is crucial to the mixture of signaling used by candidates.

Keywords: Auctions; Elections; Political Competition; Political Campaigns; Campaign Promises; Campaign Spending. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D44 D72 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09, Revised 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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