A Bargaining Model of Tax Competition

Seungjin Han and John Leach

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: This paper develops a model in which competing governments offer financial incentives to induce individual firms to locate within their jurisdictions. Equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes. There is no misallocation of capital under two of these specifications, and there might or might not be capital misallocation under the third. This result contrasts strongly with that of the standard tax competition model, which does not allow governments to treat firms individually. That model finds that competition among governments almost always leads to capital misallocation.

Keywords: tax competition; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H2 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A bargaining model of tax competition (2008)
Working Paper: A Bargaining Model of Tax Competition (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2007-09

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