Robust Competitive Auctions

Seungjin Han

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: This paper shows that a competitive distribution of auctions (Peters, 1997) is robust to the possibility of a seller's deviation not only to a direct mechanism, but rather to any arbitrary mechanism. It characterizes equilibrium allocations that are not only robust but also independent of market information transmission from buyers to sellers. For this type of equilibrium allocation, one only needs to design a market with a subset of direct mechanisms. In fact, a (constrained) ex-post efficient allocation is implemented by a market information-free robust equilibrium in a market with the set of second price auctions with reserve prices.

Keywords: competitive auctions; market information-free property; robust equilibrium; competing mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-03, Revised 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Robust competitive auctions (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2014-04

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