Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?

Jeffrey Carpenter and Peter Matthews

Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics

Abstract: The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third party punishment is surprisingly thin, however. In this paper, we report on the results of an experiment designed to evaluate two distinct explanations for this phenomenon, indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.

Keywords: experiment; voluntary contribution mechanism; norm; third party punishment; reciprocity; indignation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C91 C92 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0503.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER, INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY? (2012)
Working Paper: Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity? (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vijaya Wunnava ().