Organized Business, Political Regimes and Property Rights across the Russian Federation

William Pyle

Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article explores the inter-relationship of collective action within the business community, the nature of the political regime and the security of firms’ property rights. Drawing on a pair of surveys recently administered in Russia, we present evidence that post-communist business associations have begun to coordinate business influence over state actors in a manner that is sensitive to regional politics. A firm’s ability to defend itself from government predation and to shape its institutional environment as well as its propensity to invest in physical capital are strongly related to both its membership in a business association and the level of democratization in its region. Of particular note, the positive effect of association membership on securing property rights increases in less democratic regions. The evidence, that is, suggests that collective action in the business community substitutes for democratic pressure in constraining public officials.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0703.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0703

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vijaya Wunnava ().