First Evidence of Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through of EU Emissions Allowances: Examining Wholesale Electricity Prices in Germany

Georg Zachmann and Christian von Hirschhausen

Working Papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Abstract: This paper applies the literature on asymmetric price transmission to the emerging commodity market for EU emissions allowances (EUA). We utilize an error correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model to measure the relationship between CO2 price changes and the development of wholesale electricity prices. Using data from the German market for electricity and EUAs, we find that the rising prices of EUAs have a stronger impact on wholesale electricity prices than falling prices -- the first empirical evidence of asymmetric cost pass-through for these new allowances.

Date: 2007-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: First evidence of asymmetric cost pass-through of EU emissions allowances: Examining wholesale electricity prices in Germany (2008)
Working Paper: First Evidence of Asymmetric Cost Pass-through of EU Emissions Allowances: Examining Wholesale Electricity Prices in Germany (2007)
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