Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism

Keiichi Morimoto ()

No 35, Discussion Papers from Meisei University, School of Economics

Abstract: This study re-examines the optimal delegation problem of monetary policy under preference uncertainty of the central banker. Liberal central bankers are desirable when uncertainty is strong, which is emphasized when the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter, as some empirical works report. However, appointing conservative central bankers is optimal with standard parameter values when monetary policies are conducted by committees, as in most actual economies.

Keywords: monetary policy; delegation; uncertain preferences; committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mei:wpaper:35

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